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 1 
Abstract 
 
By 2016, approximately one-half of American police agencies had adopted body-worn cameras 
(BWCs). Though a growing body of research has examined the impact of BWCs on outcomes 
such as use of force, complaints, and perceptions of police, few have considered how and why 
some agencies adopted BWCs, while others have not. With guidance from the diffusion of 
innovations paradigm, the current study explores variation in BWC adoption by police agencies. 
Drawing on a survey administered to a national probability sample of 665 municipal police 
executives in the spring of 2018, we found agency size, region, and the demographic 
composition of municipalities were associated with BWC usage. We then examined executives’ 
support for (or opposition to) legislation that would require BWC footage to be released publicly. 
Results suggest (1) a variety of environmental factors were associated with support, and (2) the 
correlates of support varied across agencies of different sizes.  
Keywords: body-worn cameras, innovation, technology, law enforcement, institutional theory 
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Introduction 
American police agencies have faced enormous pressure to embrace and deploy body-
worn cameras (BWCs) in recent years (President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, 2015; 
White & Malm, 2020). This pressure stems from the belief that close-up footage of police-citizen 
encounters can shed light on whether officers’ actions are constitutional and necessary, and 
enhance accountability when misconduct occurs (White, 2014a). Explaining the fervor for 
BWCs, Lum and colleagues (2019, p. 19) said there may be “a growing expectation among the 
public that adopting BWCs is a marker of a responsive, transparent, and legitimate police 
organization.” BWCs are also supported by officers as they protect against frivolous complaints 
and disciplinary investigations, offer more realistic depictions of police work, and assure the 
courts and public when proper procedures are followed (Gaub et al., in press). To date, more than 
seventy unique studies have tested these claims (Lum et al., 2019). While the evidence is mixed, 
it suggests that in some contexts BWCs offer benefits for both police and citizens (Malm, 2019). 
BWCs gained national attention following two pivotal events – Manhattan Federal 
District Court Judge Scheindlin’s recommendation that the New York Police Department 
(NYPD) wear cameras to prevent racial profiling in 2013, and the fatal shooting of Michael 
Brown by a Ferguson (MO) police officer in 2014 (White & Malm, 2020). By 2014, between 
one quarter and one third of U.S. police agencies were using cameras on at least some of their 
patrol officers (Miller et al., 2014; Reaves, 2015). In 2015, the two largest manufacturers—
TASER (now Axon) and VieVu—reported selling devices to 41% of U.S. departments (Mearian, 
2015). Most recently, the Bureau of Justice Statistics found nearly one-half of agencies in 2016 – 
approximately 9,000 in total – had adopted the technology, including 80% of agencies 
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employing 500 or more officers (Hyland, 2018). Note these estimates are already four years old, 
so the number of agencies using BWCs may now be higher. 
BWCs are part of an ongoing tradition in law enforcement to leverage advanced 
technologies to improve the distribution of police services, the effectiveness of crime control 
strategies, and the efficiency and fairness of case processing (see, e.g., Manning, 1996 on cellular 
phones; Weisburd et al., 2003 on CompStat; and White, 2014b on TASERs). Criminal justice 
scholars have pointed to Wejnert’s (2002) diffusion of innovations framework as a useful tool for 
understanding why certain innovations – such as BWCs – take root, spread, and become 
normalized in criminal justice (Klinger, 2003; Morabito, 2010; Skogan & Hartnett, 2005; Weiss, 
1997; White, 2014b; White & Malm, 2020). Wejnert (2002) identified three groups of factors – 
characteristics of the innovation (BWCs), the adopter (police agencies), and the larger 
environment (the served community) – which influence whether an innovation diffuses in a 
social system. In criminal justice, understanding this process can inform our broader 
understanding of how change occurs in the system, the specific social forces driving demands for 
new innovations and reforms, and the roles these innovations will play moving forward (Klinger, 
2003). Thus far, BWC research has focused on the characteristics of the innovation (BWCs) and 
its impact on adopters and stakeholders (Lum et al., 2019). Few have tried to trace or explain the 
diffusion of the technology, or examine what agency and environmental factors are related to its 
adoption, usage, and support (see Nowacki & Willits, 2018; Smith, 2019 for exceptions). As 
such, our understanding of how and why BWCs have diffused in U.S. law enforcement is 
incomplete.  
Guided by the diffusion of innovations paradigm, the current study explores variation in 
BWC usage at the agency level. Drawing on a survey administered to a national probability 
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sample of 665 municipal police chiefs in the spring of 2018, the paper first examines the 
relationship between BWC usage and agency size, as well as the geographic, political, and 
cultural conditions of the agency’s environment (Wejnert, 2002). To assess how transparent 
respondents are willing to be with BWCs, we further explore whether these factors are related to 
support for legislation that would require releasing BWC video upon request as public 
information.  
The Innovation – Body-Worn Cameras 
Wejnert’s (2002) summary of the diffusion of innovations literature identified three 
groups of factors affecting whether an innovation becomes established and spreads in a social 
system: characteristics of the innovation, the innovator, and the environment. With respect to the 
innovation, the anticipated benefits and consequences of adoption can affect diffusion. There 
may be both private and public consequences, reflecting the impact of the innovation on adopters 
and external stakeholders. Innovations tend to be viewed more favorably by stakeholders when 
potential benefits outweigh the risks and costs. Throughout police history, there are examples of 
innovations that have and have not taken root. For example, DNA evidence may only be used by 
police homicide detectives as a last resort, because the analysis process is expensive and onerous 
(Schroeder & White, 2009). COMPSTAT, on the other hand, diffused widely because it meshed 
well with the existing values and operations of policing (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Weisburd 
et al., 2003).  
BWC research has thus far focused on testing the consequences, costs, and benefits of the 
innovation (Lum et al., 2019). Police agencies began adopting BWCs in hopes they would 
enhance transparency, improve perceptions of police, civilize police-citizen encounters, offer 
evidentiary value, and provide opportunities for training (White, 2014a). Many studies show 
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BWCs can improve police working conditions by reducing citizen complaints (see, e.g., Ariel et 
al., 2015; Braga et al., 2017; Hedberg et al., 2017; Jennings et al., 2015), improving citizen 
perceptions of and interactions with police (Crow et al., 2017; Demir et al., online first; Sousa et 
al., 2018; White et al., 2017), and reducing court case processing time (Morrow et al., 2016; 
White, Todak, et al., 2018). Further, BWCs may reduce police-citizen violence in some contexts 
(Gaub & White, in press).  
White and Malm (2020) argue BWC diffusion was facilitated by support from diverse 
groups of stakeholders who are normally at odds with each other: police leadership 
organizations, civil rights groups, police unions, and citizens. However, there are still concerns 
among stakeholders. The most significant is the immense cost of storing video footage which, for 
large agencies, can add up to millions of dollars per year (Bakst & Foley, 2015; Phillips, 2015). 
Agencies must also dedicate human resources to training, reviewing and redacting footage, 
auditing videos for officer behavior, technological support, and order maintenance (White & 
Malm, 2020). Yet, despite the up-front costs, BWCs have the potential to generate a net 
reduction in costs to an agency over time. Braga and colleagues (2017) calculated a savings of $4 
million per year after the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department adopted BWCs, mostly due 
to the reduced time spent investigating citizen complaints. 
Also using a diffusion of innovations framework, Todak and colleagues (2018) conducted 
focus groups and interviews with a range of stakeholders impacted by the adoption of BWCs in 
Spokane (WA) and Tempe (AZ). Stakeholders voiced reservations about BWCs based on their 
positions in the community. Victims’ advocates, for example, were concerned with their clients’ 
worst moments being preserved on BWC video, which could damage reputations and hurt future 
employment prospects. Prosecutors were overwhelmed with the amount of video evidence they 
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now had to process for each case. Similarly, some agencies are less enthusiastic about BWCs 
following high profile research studies that produced nonsignificant findings, raising questions 
about whether the financial costs are justified (Greenfieldboyce, 2017). For example, White and 
colleagues (2017) discovered few citizens (28%) who were recorded on a BWC were actually 
aware of it, raising questions about the hypothesized “civilizing effect,” while Yokum and 
colleagues (2017) found no impact on police use of force in Washington, D.C.  
This is by no means an exhaustive review of studies that have explored the real and/or 
perceived costs and benefits of BWCs (for that, see Lum et al. [2019]). Yet, it demonstrates that 
chief among concerns with the innovation are high costs and questions about effectiveness. 
Certainly, concerns about the innovation figure prominently when agencies consider adopting 
BWCs (Hyland, 2018), but the diffusion of innovations literature suggests characteristics of the 
adopter and external environment matter, too.  
The Innovator – Police Agencies 
With respect to the innovators, size matters, as “rates of adoption typically vary 
according to whether an entity is an individual, a small group, or a large conglomerate” (Klinger, 
2003, p. 462). In policing, large agencies are more apt to adopt new innovations (Walker, 2008), 
and this has indeed been the case with BWCs (Hyland, 2018). One theory for this pattern is 
larger agencies simply have larger budgets and are able to cover the high costs of BWC 
implementation and video storage (Reaves, 2015). Countering this point, Nowacki and Willits 
(2018) found agencies with larger budgets were less likely to have BWCs. They speculated “the 
cost to test and implement BWCs is still prohibitively high for large agencies” (p. 848). High 
budget agencies may also be better insulated from external pressures to conform to public 
demands (Smith, 2019).  
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Another theory is larger agencies tend to be more familiar with adopting new strategies 
(Morabito, 2010; Roberts et al., 2012) and technologies (Darroch & Mazerolle, 2013; Willits & 
Nowacki, 2016), which could translate to less fear of uncertainties. Indeed, agencies that had 
adopted innovations in the past were more likely to be using BWCs in a recent study (Nowacki 
& Willits, 2018). Furthermore, large agencies hold positions of higher status in policing (White, 
2014b). These high status actors tend to adopt innovations first, with lower status actors 
following suit (Weiss, 1997). Finally, because large cities can afford to pay their chiefs higher 
annual base salaries (Reaves, 2015), they may attract more qualified and experienced candidates. 
Outside candidates may be motivated to implement new reforms because doing so was an 
underlying factor in their hire, or they may have been selected for their reputation as an 
innovator (Borins, 2002). As a result, large agencies may be more likely to adopt BWCs in part 
due to the personal characteristics of their chiefs.  
Nowacki and Willits (2018) also found police departments with collective bargaining 
were less likely to use BWCs, while agencies making greater use of technology in general and 
those operating more specialized units were more likely to have cameras. Noting that their study 
focused only on organizational measures, the authors called for future research examining the 
relationship between environmental factors and BWC adoption.  
The Environment 
Policing researchers have long recognized the importance of the environment in shaping 
the organization and functions of police agencies (Crank & Langworthy, 1992; Katz, 2001; 
Klinger, 2004; Reiss & Bordua, 1967). These factors may also shape agencies’ decisions to 
implement new innovations, including BWCs (see also Smith, 2019’s application of institutional 
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theory to this issue). Among the environmental factors identified by Wejnert (2002) that shape 
the diffusion of innovations are geography, political conditions, and culture.  
Geography 
Relevant geographical features include an agency’s size and physical location. As noted, 
the largest agencies serving the most populous cities (e.g., Los Angeles, New York, Washington, 
D.C.) tend to hold high status positions in the field and are more likely to seek out new 
innovations (Weiss, 1997; White, 2014b). Less populated jurisdictions – particularly those in 
rural areas – often cover larger physical spaces with fewer officers per capita. Because these 
agencies have unique responsibilities, priorities, and challenges, they may feel less pressure from 
their communities to explore new innovations like BWCs (Gaub et al., 2017).  
U.S. regions also tend to reflect different patterns in political culture, attitudes, and 
beliefs, which can in turn influence local legislation. Agencies in the Western U.S., for example, 
operate under more liberal laws surrounding police use of BWCs and the public release of 
information. If police agencies view their state’s laws as overly lenient or open – providing 
unrestrained public access to BWC video footage – they may be less willing to adopt the 
technology (Gaub et al., in press). Alternatively, White and Malm (2020, pp. 94–95) argued “the 
west and southwest tend to be more progressive in terms of city and political governance, 
compared to the more traditional northeastern and southern regions of the country.” Agencies 
located in these more traditional regions may be less likely to seek out state-of-the-art 
innovations in policing, instead preferring the status quo.  
Political Conditions 
Institutional theory suggests organizations like police departments cultivate and maintain 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the public through the “incorporation of powerful myths into 
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[their] structure and activities” (Crank & Langworthy, 1992, p. 338; see also Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). In other words, agencies often do what they believe is expected of them by various 
institutional sovereigns, including professional organizations, elected officials, the media, and 
community groups, to name just a few (Donaldson, 1995; Mastrofski & Uchida, 1993; Matusiak 
et al., 2017; Wilson, 1968). Each of these entities can exert pressure on police departments to 
adopt new innovations or engage in greater transparency (Smith, 2019). In the case of BWCs, it 
is possible that perceptions of (non)support from elected officials and/or courtroom personnel 
would factor into the decision to adopt. For example, police executives who do not feel 
supported by their institutional sovereigns might be drawn to the potential evidentiary value of 
BWC footage, which documents officer behaviors during official encounters, and can often aid 
in the investigation of citizen complaints (e.g., Ariel et al., 2015; Jennings et al., 2015; White, 
Gaub, et al., 2018). Accordingly, research is needed that can shed light on whether perceived 
support from various institutional sovereigns is associated with a police department’s adoption of 
BWCs or how transparent they are willing to be with the resulting footage. 
Research also suggests conservatives are more supportive of the police (Brown, 2017; 
Silver & Pickett, 2015) and police use of surplus military equipment such as computers and 
surveillance tools (Moule et al., 2019). In December 2014 (just four months after the Michael 
Brown shooting), the Pew Research Center surveyed a random sample of 1,507 U.S. adults and 
found that 14% of Republican respondents believed putting more BWCs on police officers 
would be a bad idea, versus only 8% of Democratic respondents (Doherty et al., 2014). Thus, in 
predominantly conservative- or Republican-leaning jurisdictions, we might expect to see less 
demand for BWCs, since they are frequently touted as an accountability tool for monitoring law 
enforcement. However, Crow et al. (2017) found a positive relationship between satisfaction 
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with police performance and perceived benefits of using BWCs among citizens in two Florida 
counties, and theorized that “community members who believe the police are doing a good job 
and treating people fairly are more likely to support BWCs, not as a mechanism to correct bad 
police behavior, but as a tool to combat negative views of the police” (p. 605). While they did 
not control for respondents’ political ideology or party identification, their reasoning suggests 
conservatives may be more supportive of BWCs than the more left-leaning members of the 
public. We thus anticipate that the political ideology of an agency’s community is relevant to 
their decision to adopt (or not adopt) BWCs.   
Culture 
With respect to the culture of an agency’s external environment, at least three factors may 
be relevant to the diffusion of BWCs: racial composition, officer-involved shooting rates, and 
violent crime rates. The police have historically enjoyed lower levels of support from the Black 
and Hispanic communities (Decker, 1981; Pew Research Center, 2016; Walker, 1977; Weitzer & 
Tuch, 2005), who express greater concern about police misconduct (Weitzer & Tuch, 2004), and 
discriminatory tactics (Tyler & Wakslak, 2004). In their national survey of 599 U.S. residents, 
Sousa et al. (2018) found Black respondents were significantly more likely than White 
respondents to support policies requiring police officers to wear BWCs. Similarly, an evaluation 
study in Prince George’s County, MD found that Black and Latino citizens had more positive 
atttiudes toward BWCs than White citizens (Ray et al., 2017). In light of such findings, agencies 
serving cities where a larger share of the population is Black or Hispanic/Latino might sense 
more pressure from their communities to adopt BWCs (Graham et al., 2019). 
Relatedly, police agencies operating in environments that experience higher rates of 
deadly force may perceive a greater need for BWCs to capture these critical incidents on camera. 
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White and Malm (2020, pp. 95–96) argued “police killings of mostly minority citizens continued 
to draw national-level attention [between 2014 and 2019]…and interest in police BWCs was 
shaped by this crisis in police-community relations.” Concurrently, there is accumulating 
evidence that police shootings can have “spillover” effects on communities (Alang et al., 2017; 
Galovski et al., 2016; Yimgang et al., 2017). It is feasible that one such spillover effect is 
pressure for nearby agencies to adopt BWCs. For example, other agencies in Missouri might 
have been more inclined to adopt BWCs in the aftermath of Michael Brown’s shooting in 
Ferguson. Similarly, agencies operating in states with higher rates of officer-involved shootings 
might face more pressure to adopt BWCs than those in states with lower rates.  
Finally, BWCs have been touted as a tool for furthering criminal cases due to the 
available video evidence (White, 2014a). A few studies have concluded that cases involving 
BWC video are more successful and likely to result in convictions (Ellis et al., 2015; Goodall, 
2007; Morrow et al., 2016; ODS Consulting, 2011; Owens et al., 2014), though Lum and 
colleagues (2019) cautioned that many employed weak methodological designs. No research has 
examined how BWCs affect investigations into officer actions, because they are primarily being 
used to prosecute citizens (Merola et al., 2016). Nevertheless, given perceptions that BWCs may 
be useful for reducing crime and prosecuting cases, agencies serving cities with high crime rates 
may be more likely to adopt the technology. Further, residents of these cities may be more 
concerned about the crime problem and vocal about the need for BWCs (Crow et al., 2017).  
Current Study 
 The purpose of the current study was threefold. First, we aimed to generate a national 
estimate of the percentage of municipal agencies currently using BWCs, as an update to the 2016 
iteration of the LEMAS survey (Hyland, 2018). Second, we sought a better understanding of the 
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factors associated with the adoption of BWCs. Based on our review of the literature, we expect 
characteristics of the innovators (e.g., agency size) and the environment (i.e., geography, 
political climate, culture) are relevant. Finally, we explored variation in police executives’ 
commitment to transparency with BWC footage – again considering characteristics of the 
innovators and the environment. If executives are hesitant to release BWC footage to the 
public—for any number of reasons—this may erode their legitimacy in the eyes of the public 
(Sousa et al., 2018; Tyler, 1990, 2004). As such, it is imperative to understand the external 
factors that increase or decrease executives’ willingness to release BWC footage. Before 
presenting our analyses and results, we now turn to a discussion of our data and methodology.  
Data and Methods 
 
Our data were obtained as part of a larger study of police-community relations that 
entailed surveying a national probability sample of municipal police chiefs in 2018. Using the 
National Directory of Law Enforcement Administrators (NDLEA), we obtained the mailing 
addresses of 12,039 municipal police departments and the names of their current chiefs. We 
placed each of these departments into one of four strata based on the number of sworn officers in 
their agency: 0 to 24, 25 to 49, 50 to 99, and 100 or more.1 We then drew a random sample of 
624 agencies from each stratum, resulting in a stratified random sample of 2,496 departments. 
Given the decline in response rates to police surveys over the last 10 years—especially among 
those not administered in person—we anticipated a modest at best response rate (Nix, Pickett, 
Baek, & Alpert, 2019). Thus, sampling 624 agencies from each stratum increased our likelihood 
of having adequate power to detect small to medium sized effects. We also oversampled large 
agencies, which are fewer in number than small agencies, but responsible for the bulk of police-
                                                 
1 The Bureau of Justice Statistics similarly stratifies by agency size for its Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (see also Strom & Hickman, 2010). 
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citizen interactions each year. For four weeks beginning in February, we mailed pre-notification 
postcards, surveys, and follow-up surveys to the chief of each department (Dillman et al., 2009). 
We received 675 completed surveys by the time data collection ended in mid-April, resulting in 
an overall response rate of 27 percent. We removed ten surveys: one from a sheriff’s department, 
one from a village department that contracts with a state police force, and eight that failed to 
provide enough information for us to determine the stratum from which they were sampled. This 
resulted in a final sample of N=665. Response rates varied slightly across each of our four strata 
(see Table 1). 
[Table 1 here] 
Dependent Variables 
 We considered two outcomes in this study. The first was whether agencies had adopted 
our innovation of interest, BWCs, at the time of the survey (1=yes, 0=no). The number of 
agencies in each stratum that indicated they were currently using BWCs is presented in Table 2, 
along with projected national estimates we generated based on our findings. Consistent with 
existing evidence (Hyland, 2018), respondents from agencies with 100 or more full-time sworn 
officers were more likely to indicate their agencies used BWCs than respondents from agencies 
in the other three strata (64% v. 47%, respectively; t = -3.90, p < .001).  
[Table 2 here] 
Our second outcome, support releasing BWC footage, was a measure of how transparent 
agencies reported they were willing to be with BWC footage. We asked respondents to indicate 
the extent they would “support or oppose a law that requires agencies to release body-worn 
camera footage upon request as public information” (1=strongly support to 5=strongly oppose; 
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reverse coded prior to analysis). Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables and all other 
variables included in the analyses are presented in Table 3.  
 [Table 3 here] 
Independent Variables 
 Based on our review of the diffusion of innovations literature (Klinger, 2003; Wejnert, 
2002; White, 2014b; White & Malm, 2020), we identified several geographic, political, and 
cultural characterstics of each responding agency’s environment to model as covariates, which 
may shape an agency’s decision to adopt BWCs.  
Geography. Agencies serving more populous cities respond to a greater number of 
incidents on a daily basis (National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2016), resulting in more 
police-citizen interactions. The perceived need to record police-citizen interactions may be 
greater for these agencies and communities. To estimate the size of the served community, we 
calculated each city’s three-year average population from 2014 to 2016 using the Uniform Crime 
Report (UCR).2 Natural log transformations were used because this variable was highly skewed. 
We also measured region of the United States with three dummy variables: South, Midwest, and 
West (using Northeast as the reference category).3 
Politics. First, consistent with police research on institutional theory (Donaldson, 1995; 
Mastrofski & Uchida, 1993; Matusiak et al., 2017; J. J. Smith, 2019; Wilson, 1968), respondents 
were asked to indicate how often (1 = never, 2 = rarely, 3 = sometimes, 4 = often, 5 = always) 
they felt they had the support of four institutional sovereigns: the mayor, city council, the courts, 
and local prosecutors. Responses were averaged to generate a mean scale that indicated 
                                                 
2 We averaged across three years to ensure fewer cases were listwise deleted for not reporting to the UCR in 2016. 
Population was measured using the UCR to ensure it was consistent with the manner in which we measured violent 
crime. 
3 Regions were defined as they are in the UCR. 
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acceptable internal reliability (α = .72), with higher scores reflecting greater perceived support 
from institutional sovereigns. Second, to test our hypothesis that political conservatism would be 
related to our dependent variables, we acquired the percentage of each county that voted for 
Donald Trump in 2016 (Liep, 2018).4 Percent Trump Voters is a continuous variable that ranged 
from a minimum of 12.95% to a maximum of 89.34%.  
Culture. We used several measures to capture environmental culture. First, we measured 
each city’s racial/ethnic composition with two continuous variables—percent Black and percent 
Hispanic—which we obtained from the American Community Survey’s 2016 5-year estimates. 
These variables were highly skewed, so we used natural log transformations in our regression 
models. Second, using The Washington Post’s “Fatal Force” database, we calculated the average 
state OIS rate associated with each jurisdiction in our sample. That is, for each year from 2015 to 
2017, we divided each state’s total number of officer-involved shootings (OIS) by its population 
and multiplied by 1 million to generate three yearly rates. We then summed the rates and divided 
by three to generate three-year average rates. Finally, we calculated each city’s three-year 
average violent crime rate (i.e., number of violent crimes divided by population and multiplied 
by 100,000) from 2014 through 2016 from the UCR. Again, this variable was highly skewed, so 
we used natural log transformations in our regression models.  
Analytic Strategy 
 We analyzed each of our four strata (i.e., agency size) separately for two reasons. First, 
doing so is more straightforward than combining them, which would require a post-stratification 
weighting procedure because we oversampled larger departments. More important, simply 
                                                 
4 We acknowledge this is an imperfect proxy for each city’s level of political conservatism. Unfortunately, this is as 
close as we could get to city-level election results (see https://uselectionatlas.org/BOTTOM/store_data.php). Future 
research should continue to explore the relationship between community conservatism/liberalism and the diffusion 
of innovations in policing with more precise measures of the former.  
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controlling for agency size could mask meaningful within-stratum relationships between our 
covariates and the outcomes. Large agencies are more influential and more likely to be 
innovators in the police profession (Hyland, 2018; Smith, 2019; White, 2014b). They are also 
likely to be more familiar with incorporating cutting-edge technologies, given their larger 
budgets. It should come as no surprise, then, that large agencies in our sample were more likely 
to be using BWCs at the time of our survey than smaller agencies (see Table 2). Yet, the 
environmental forces that drove them to adopt BWCs might differ substantially from those that 
may have compelled small agencies to adopt. Analyzing the strata separately allows us to 
account for this possibility in a more straightforward fashion. 
 We estimated logistic regression equations to predict our first outcome, using BWCs, as it 
was a dichotomous variable. Our second outcome, support releasing BWC footage, was 
measured on a five-point ordinal scale. Accordingly, we estimated ordered logistic regression 
equations to model this outcome variable. For all models, we used robust standard errors 
clustered by county to relax the assumption of independence of observations, since agencies 
were nested within 380 counties. Analyses were performed using Stata version 15.1.  
Results 
  Table 4 presents the results of four logistic regression models predicting BWC usage 
across each strata. Due to listwise deletion of item-missing data, the N for each model ranges 
from 113 to 157. The most consistent finding that emerged was that across all four strata, 
southern agencies were significantly more likely than northeastern agencies to be currently using 
BWCs. In the two largest strata, western agencies were also significantly more likely than 
northeastern agencies to be using BWCs. Percent Black was statistically significant (at p < .10) 
in all four models, but the direction of the coefficient varied. In jurisdictions with 24 or fewer 
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officers (Model 1), percent Black was inversely associated with BWC usage (b = -.502, p = .067, 
odds ratio = .605). In the three larger strata (Models 2 – 4), percent Black was positively 
associated with BWC usage (odds ratios ranged from 1.533 to 1.728).  
 Table 5 displays the results of four ordered logistic regression models predicting support 
for legislation that would require the release of BWC footage on request as public information 
across each strata. In these models, we also controlled for whether the agency reported using 
BWCs, as their increased familiarity with the technology might affect their support for such 
legislation. Here, the findings were much more nuanced, so we will discuss each stratum in turn. 
In the 0-24 stratum, state OIS rate was positively and significantly related to support for 
legislation that would require release of BWC footage upon request as public information (b = 
.366, p < .05, odds ratio = 1.442). Thus, among the smallest agencies, a higher state-level rate of 
OIS is associated with greater support for transparency. Percent Trump voters was significantly 
inversely related to support for releasing BWC footage. The relationship was rather weak (b = -
.032, p < .05, odds ratio = .970), but suggests that among the smallest agencies, as county 
political conservatism increases, support for such legislation diminishes, net of the other factors 
we controlled. In the 25-49 stratum, state OIS rate was also significantly associated with support 
for releasing BWC footage, but the effect ran in the opposite direction (b = -.464, p < .01, odds 
ratio = .649). Among agencies of this size, higher state-level OIS rates are associated with 
opposition to legislation mandating release of BWC footage upon public information request. 
Percent Hispanic was also significantly and inversely related to the outcome (b = -.329, p = .086, 
odds ratio = .719), suggesting that among agencies of this size, as the relative size of the 
Hispanic population increases, agencies tend to be less supportive of such legislation. Finally, 
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perceived support from sovereigns was significantly and positively associated with the outcome 
(b = .572, p = .084, odds ratio = 1.772).  
 Turning attention to the third model of Table 5, we found that in the 50-99 stratum, state 
OIS rate was significantly and inversely associated with support for releasing BWC footage (b = 
-.489, p < .05, odds ratio = .584). Among agencies of this size, higher state-level OIS rates are 
associated with decreased support legislation mandating public release of BWC footage. 
Perceived support from sovereigns was significantly and positively associated with support for 
such legisliation (b = 1.111, p < .01, odds ratio = 3.037). In this model, we also uncovered 
significant regional variation in our outcome. Southern agencies (b = 1.894, p < .01, odds ratio = 
6.649) agencies were significantly more supportive of such legislation than their similarly sized 
northeastern counterparts. Finally, the likelihood ratio chi-squared test for our fourth model 
(100+ stratum) was statistically nonsignificant (LR χ2 = 10.394, p = .49), indicating that the 
inclusion of our covariates provided no greater explanatory power than would a constant-only 
model. Thus, the covariates do a poor job predicting variation in support for legislation requiring 
public release of BWC footage among the largest agencies.  
Discussion 
Approximately half of all municipal police departments are now using BWCs, with a 
greater share of large agencies using them compared to smaller agencies (see also Hyland, 2018). 
The literature on BWCs has focused on whether they affect attitudes and behaviors of officers 
and citizens (Lum et al., 2019). Yet, with a few exceptions (Nowacki & Willits, 2018; Smith, 
2019), we lack evidence as to what drives agencies to adopt the technology, while others opt out, 
in light of mounting evidence of their benefits and cost effectiveness. Applying Wejnert’s (2002) 
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diffusion of innovations framework, we examined whether environmental factors were related to 
the adoption of BWCs by municipal police departments. 
Regional variation in the adoption of BWCs was most evident, with southern agencies in 
our sample significantly more likely than northeastern agencies to have BWCs across all four 
strata. In the two largest strata, western agencies were also more likely to be using BWCs. It is 
possible that such regional effects are a function of the pervasiveness of police unions in the 
northeastern United States, and the lack of unionization in the south (Walker, 2008). Though 
contemporary research on police unions is nonexistent, Walker (2008, p. 96) noted “virtually all 
of the published items that express an opinion on the impact of police unions regard them as 
having a negative effect, particularly on innovation, accountability, and police–community 
relations.” This may well be the case with BWCs, as Nowacki and Willits (2018) found agencies 
with collective bargaining were less likely to have cameras. Anecdotally, police unions have 
fought against the implementation of BWCs in some agencies. In Boston, for example, the police 
union filed an injunction to stop the department from requiring its officers to wear cameras 
(Levenson & Allen, 2016). Walker (2008) also points out, however, that most innovation in 
policing occurs within large police departments, which are also more likely to be unionized: 
We can assume, therefore, that some departments have been able to manage 
innovation better than others…An important but as yet unanswered question is the 
extent to which successful innovation is the result of different management 
strategies for relating to the local union and the terms of the collective bargaining 
contract (p. 101).  
 
Unfortunately, our data only allow us to speculate on what the observed regional 
variation means with respect to the diffusion of BWCs. To better understand these findings, we 
recommend future research look closer at how regional, state-level, and agency-level factors 
shape this diffusion. In particular, research examining how police unions negotiate with 
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departments considering the adoption of BWCs, and how the presence of unions impacts the 
adoption of innovations in policing more generally, would be beneficial. This work may shed 
light on how some agencies, as Walker (2008) described, work along with the union to progress. 
At the state level, moreover, some states may have taken steps to encourage the diffusion of 
BWCs through legislation. This may be the case in areas where there have been controversial in-
custody deaths that generated national attention, compelling states to show they are taking action 
towards police reform. For example, after a North Charleston police officer was recorded fatally 
shooting Walter Scott in the back as he fled in 2015, then-South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley 
signed a bill into law that purportedly required all police departments in the state to outfit 
officers with BWCs.5 Future research should look to understand how state-level legislation has 
impacted the adoption and spread of BWCs. 
We also found that BWC usage was correlated with the racial composition of an area. 
Percent Black was significant at the p < .10 level in every model, though the findings are not 
straightforward. In the smallest stratum the coefficient was negative, while in the larger three it 
was positive. The seemingly contradictory findings suggest that the racial makeup of cities on its 
own does not tell the whole story, but plays a role in the diffusion of BWCs. It may be that 
smaller agencies serving areas with higher concentrations of minorities simply do not have the 
resources to implement BWC programs, or do not prioritize spending on law enforcement and 
crime control expenditures. In larger police agencies, on the other hand, a higher representation 
                                                 
5 An anonymous reviewer suggested that we remove respondents from South Carolina (SC) or any other state with 
laws requiring agencies to use BWCs from our analysis. There were 9 respondents from SC and they all indicated 
that their agency was using BWCs at the time of our survey. Other states, including California, Connecticut, Florida, 
and Nevada require some – but not all – agencies to use BWCs. We re-estimated each of the models presented in 
Tables 4 and 5 with SC respondents excluded. Results were substantively similar, with two minor exceptions. In 
Model 3 of Table 4, the p-value for %Black shifted from .097 to .127, and in Model 2 of Table 5, the p-value for 
%Hispanic shifted from .086 to .140. However, due to a loophole in SC’s law (House Bill 47, 2015) which only 
required agencies to adopt BWCs if they were able to secure external funding, we opted to retain our original 
models. Full results of this supplemental analysis are available on request.    
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of minority community members, combined with public unrest surrounding police use of force, 
may leave high-profile police departments with no choice but to implement BWCs.  
Given tremendous state-to-state variation in laws governing BWC data and public 
records requests, the second goal of our study was to examine executives’ attitudes concerning 
the release of BWC footage.6 Though there may be justifiable reasons to delay the release of 
footage (e.g., victims’ identities and investigation integrity need to be protected), agencies risk 
eroding community trust when they do so (Lum et al., 2019). For example, after an officer fatally 
shot Keith Lamont Scott in 2016, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Chief Putney did not release 
footage for four days, until finally succumbing to pressure from local politicians and violent 
protests that resulted in 45 arrests, over 30 injuries, and one civilian death (Fausset et al., 2016; 
MacMillan & Blake, 2016). Prominent activists, including Deray McKesson of Black Lives 
Matter, expressed outrage at Chief Putney on social media, tweeting “no justice, no peace” to 
approximately 1 million followers.7 Similar stories have cropped up across the country. Clearly 
the release of video footage is fundamental to being viewed as transparent by the community. If 
agencies decline to release videos to the community, particularly after critical incidents, the 
decision to adopt a BWC program may seem fruitless to members of the public and even fuel 
further suspicion and criticism of the police. Accordingly, our study also examined whether 
environmental factors were related to police executives’ support for legislation requiring the 
public release of BWC video.  
Our analysis produced different and sometimes conflicting results depending on agency 
size. For example, in the smallest agencies, state-level OIS rate was positively associated with 
                                                 
6 Twenty-three states and the District of Columbia have passed open record laws pertaining to BWCs. Many states 
have built-in exemptions. See http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/body-worn-cameras-
interactive-graphic.aspx#/.  
7 See https://twitter.com/deray/status/779789725016084482.  
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support for legislation, while percent Trump voters was negatively associated. In the middle two 
strata, state-level OIS rate was negatively associated with support. Also in the middle two strata, 
executives who felt supported by the mayor, city council, courts, and prosecutors were more 
supportive of such legislation. By and large, racial composition was not related to support for 
legislation, with the exception of percent Hispanic in the second stratum (25 to 49 officers). 
Among these agencies, as the Hispanic share of the population increased, executive support for 
BWC legislation declined.  
Police executives may experience dramatically different pressures and hold different 
perspectives regarding the implications for releasing video footage, depending on the size and 
status of their agency. Larger agencies may be under greater scrutiny from their community and 
at the national level, and thus more familiar with social pressures to be transparent (Regoli et al., 
1989). Larger agencies also deal with different crime problems and responsibilities, which could 
affect their attitudes towards publicly releasing videos. On the other hand, it may be that 
variables not captured in our analysis are better predictors, as suggested by our low model R-
squared values. For example, our survey did not include measures of community trust or 
legitimacy. Agencies may be more inclined to adopt BWCs when legitimacy is low (Smith, 
2019), and more inclined to release BWC videos to the public if legitimacy is high. The nature of 
legislation already in place may also play a role. Agencies that have been required by state law to 
publicly release videos for some time may be more comfortable doing so if releasing videos has 
not had a demonstrably negative effect. Broadly, future research should continue to investigate 
public and police attitudes toward the release of BWC footage to the public and search for an 
optimal policy that takes all competing stakeholder concerns into account. 
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Our findings also underscore the need for more research on small police departments, 
which comprise the vast majority of agencies in the US. Researchers are heavily incentivized to 
study large police agencies so as to ensure larger sample sizes and, ultimately, increase the 
likelihood of publishing the results. However, our findings suggest that the diffusion of 
innovations may play out differently depending on agency size. Namely, the sign for %Black 
flipped from the first the second model of Table 4, as did the sign for State OIS Rate from the 
first to the second model of Table 5. In the smallest agencies, then, these variables are relevant 
just as elsewhere. However, theUntil the field begins to study a more diverse set of 
organizations, our knowledge of policing will be limited to what occurs in large, urban 
departments. 
Limitations 
Our study has several limitations. First, we only surveyed municipal police departments, 
and therefore cannot speak to BWC adoption by other types of law enforcement agencies, such 
as sheriff’s offices. Relatedly, our measure of political conservatism was the percentage of the 
county that voted for Trump in the 2016 presidential election, and OIS rate was measured at the 
state level. While these do not perfectly capture the levels of conservatism or police violence in 
each specific municipality, we felt it necessary to include them as controls rather than omit them. 
Second, because these data were collected as part of a larger project, we were unable to include 
several relevant questions in the interest of space on the survey. For example, we simply asked 
respondents whether their agency uses BWCs – we did not follow up with questions about when 
they began using them, the extent they are using them (e.g., partial or full deployment), whether 
specialty units wear them, or what policies they have in place governing their use. Furthermore, 
we did not ask questions about the department’s annual budget, availability of external funding 
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for BWCs, or collective bargaining agreements. Future studies should include measures such as 
these.  
Similarly, with respect to our second outcome, we only asked individuals if they would 
support legislation pertaining to the public release of video – we have no objective measures of 
whether and when videos are in fact released. In the same respect, because our legislative 
support outcome was attitudinal, respondents’ answers may not have been reflective of their 
agency as a whole. That said, approximately three-fourths of our respondents were police chiefs, 
and the vast majority of those who were not still held high ranking positions (e.g., deputy chiefs, 
commanders, majors). It is precisely these high ranking officers who would be in a position to 
decide (or weigh in on) whether BWC footage should be released publicly.  
A third limitation of our study is the relatively small number of agencies surveyed within 
each stratum, which reduced the power of our statistical models. Future studies with larger 
samples can elucidate the generalizability and stability of our results. Finally, our survey 
achieved a 27% response rate. However, unless BWC usage was strongly correlated with 
propensity to respond to our survey, it is unlikely that our findings suffer from nonresponse bias 
(Nix et al., 2019; Pickett et al., 2018). We have no reason to believe it would be – recall that 
results reported in Table 2 closely resemble those reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics as 
of 2016 (Hyland, 2018; see also supplemental appendices in Nix et al., 2020). As such, we 
believe the estimates derived from our sample are reliable.  
Conclusion 
Partially supporting Wejnert’s (2002) diffusion of innovations framework, we find region 
and, to a lesser extent, the racial composition of cities are each important for the diffusion of 
BWCs across municipal police departments. The picture surrounding support for video release is 
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much less clear. The issue of video release should be a focus of conversation and future research 
moving forward, as the failure to release a controversial BWC video could worsen police-
community relationships rather than improve them. Police unions may also play a key role in 
diffusion of innovations in policing – particularly BWCs and the handling of controversial 
footage (Nowacki & Willits, 2018). Future research should continue to investigate.  
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Table 1. Response rates across strata. 
 
 
Stratum N Response Rate 
   
   
0 to 24 sworn 149 23.9% 
25 to 49 sworn 172 27.6% 
50 to 99 sworn 168 26.9% 
100+ sworn 176 28.2% 
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Table 2. Prevalence estimates of BWC usage in municipal police departments as of 2018, by agency size.  
 
 
 Sampled Agencies that Answered the BWC Question Population of Municipal Agencies 
       
       
Agency Size N Using BWCs Percent N 
Estimated N Using 
BWCs 
[95% CI] 
0 to 24 145 67 46.2% 8,940 4,131 [3,405 – 4,856] 
25 to 49 162 72 44.4% 1,611 716 [593 – 839] 
50 to 99 160 79 49.4% 834 412 [347 – 477] 
100+ 167 107 64.1% 654 419 [371 – 466] 
Total 634 325 47.1%* 12,039 5,678 [4,717 – 6,639] 
* Percentage is weighted to account for stratification procedure, which oversampled large departments.  
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for variables included in multivariate analyses.   
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
0 – 24 Sworn (N = 113)     
Currently Using BWCs .447 — 0 1 
Support for BWC legislation 2.596 1.217 1 5 
Avg. Population a 5,327 4,862 348 27,066 
Northeast .316 — 0 1 
South .202 — 0 1 
Midwest .307 — 0 1 
West .175 — 0 1 
Support from Sovereigns 4.017 .605 1.750 5 
% Trump Voters 56.501 15.381 8.405 89.335 
% Black a 5.122 11.398 0 69.339 
% Hispanic a 10.182 15.641 0 93.663 
Avg. State OIS Rate 2.857 1.721 .874 9.911 
Avg. Violent Crime Rate a 222.736 255.519 0 1,780.498 
25 – 49 Sworn (N = 140)     
Currently Using BWCs .489 — 0 1 
Support for BWC legislation 2.589 1.190 1 5 
Avg. Population 19,034 8,609 3,047 46,976 
Northeast .220 — 0 1 
South .255 — 0 1 
Midwest .362 — 0 1 
West .163 — 0 1 
Support from Sovereigns 4.035 .548 2.500 5 
% Trump Voters 47.345 16.078 13.513 85.677 
% Black a 12.843 19.492 0 94.321 
% Hispanic a 13.673 18.799 0 91.564 
Avg. State OIS Rate 2.792 1.429 .874 8.558 
Avg. Violent Crime Rate a 308.300 296.840 21.919 2,193.467 
50 – 99 Sworn (N = 145)     
Currently Using BWCs .469 — 0 1 
Support for BWC legislation 2.676 1.172 1 5 
Avg. Population a 39,687 17,029 4,227 110,283 
Northeast .186 — 0 1 
South .359 — 0 1 
Midwest .276 — 0 1 
West .179 — 0 1 
Support from Sovereigns 4.052 .503 2.750 5 
% Trump Voters 47.406 16.502 8.405 81.794 
% Black a 11.753 14.619 0 71.259 
% Hispanic a 12.948 13.869 .544 75.550 
Avg. State OIS Rate 2.850 1.466 .874 9.911 
Avg. Violent Crime Rate a 340.486 332.555 30.622 2,802.152 
100+ Sworn (N = 157)     
Currently Using BWCs .643 — 0 1 
Support for BWC legislation 2.790 1.193 1 5 
Avg. Population a 180,485 219,819 33,345 1,561,737 
Northeast .134 — 0 1 
South .388 — 0 1 
Midwest .210 — 0 1 
West .268 — 0 1 
Support from Sovereigns 3.990 .598 2.250 5 
% Trump Voters 43.389 12.951 9.225 74.019 
% Black a 15.220 16.594 .654 77.707 
% Hispanic a 18.495 17.122 .473 81.820 
Avg. State OIS Rate 3.160 1.568 .874 9.911 
Avg. Violent Crime Rate a 465.702 347.897 6.531 1,708.384 
a Natural log transformation used in regression models to reduce skewness.  
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Table 4. Logistic regression models predicting whether agency is currently using BWCs.  
 
 
 0 – 24 Sworn 25 – 49 Sworn 50 – 99 Sworn 100+ Sworn 
             
     
Variable b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR 
             
             
Avg. Population .276 .261 1.318 .228 .459 1.256 .725 .614 2.064 -.235 .309 .791 
Northeast (ref.) —   —   —   —   
South 2.827** .987 16.889 1.977* .887 7.224 2.688*** .797 14.710 1.914** .746 6.778 
Midwest .252 .602 1.286 .076 .615 1.079 .750 .690 2.116 .999 .702 2.714 
West .198 .928 1.220 1.018 1.073 2.769 2.290* .973 9.875 2.337* .998 10.346 
Support from 
Sovereigns 
.148 .464 1.160 -.391 .426 .676 -.539 .446 .853 -.491 .350 .612 
% Trump 
Voters 
-.014 .017 .986 .021 .016 1.021 .023 .016 1.023 .006 .018 1.006 
% Black -.502^ .274 .605 .427^ .245 1.533 .456^ .275 1.578 .547^ .321 1.728 
% Hispanic -.031 .246 .970 -.151 .233 .860 .125 .260 1.133 -.054 .249 .947 
Avg. State OIS 
Rate 
.259 .193 1.296 .190 .221 1.209 -.200 .196 .818 .020 .171 1.020 
Avg. Violent 
Crime Rate 
-.027 .151 .974 .080 .300 1.084 -.058 .305 .944 .128 .262 1.137 
Intercept -3.007 2.929 — -3.730 5.614 — -8.596 7.153 — 1.646 3.923 — 
             
N 113 140 145 157 
Likelihood χ2 18.112^ 33.771*** 26.180** 22.027* 
Pseudo R2 .169 .212 .206 .133 
NOTE: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors clustered by county (SE), and odds ratios (OR). Note that some of the odds ratios are unstable due to 
the small number of respondents in certain categories (e.g., agencies with 0-24 officers in the Northeast). They should be interpreted with caution.  
^ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 
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Table 5. Ordered logistic regression models predicting support for legislation that would require release of BWC footage upon public 
request.  
 
 
 0 – 24 Sworn 25 – 49 Sworn 50 – 99 Sworn 100+ Sworn 
             
     
Variable b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR b SE OR 
             
             
Currently Using 
BWCs 
.405 .978 1.499 .393 .365 1.482 .452 .343 1.572 .346 .348 1.413 
Avg. Population -.278 .220 .757 -.569 .393 .566 .154 .571 1.167 .036 .226 1.037 
Northeast 
(reference) 
—   —   —   —   
South -.247 .866 .781 -.291 .685 .748 1.894** .700 6.649 .053 .722 1.055 
Midwest -.215 .524 .807 -.502 .439 .606 -.029 .538 .972 -.401 .719 .670 
West -.207 .716 .813 .769 .813 2.157 1.538 1.157 4.657 -.586 1.006 .557 
Support from 
Sovereigns 
.433 .368 1.541 .572^ .331 1.772 1.111** .413 3.037 .162 .327 1.175 
% Trump Voters -.032* .015 .969 .011 .011 1.011 -.009 .013 .991 -.026^ .016 .974 
% Black .186 .183 1.204 .211 .189 1.235 -.200 .198 .818 -.067 .281 .935 
% Hispanic .196 .184 1.216 -.329^ .192 .719 -.341 .249 .711 -.241 .243 .786 
Avg. State OIS 
Rate 
.366* .170 1.442 -.464** .165 .629 -.489* .243 .613 -.029 .143 .972 
Avg. Violent 
Crime Rate 
-.085 .175 .919 .181 .173 1.198 -.256 .273 .774 .222 .227 1.248 
             
N 113 140 145 157 
Likelihood χ2 35.717*** 22.407* 29.636** 10.394 
Pseudo R2 .074 .051 .083 .022 
NOTE: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients (b), standard errors clustered by county (SE), and odds ratios (OR). Note that some of the odds ratios are unstable due to 
the small number of respondents in certain categories (e.g., agencies with 0-24 officers in the Northeast). They should be interpreted with caution. 
^ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
